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This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model à la Hotelling. In 
this setting, we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related disadvantages and 
outsourcing-induced production cost advantages of a large economy. The model gives a rich 
picture of possible trade and welfare effects of a movement towards free trade and points to 
the role of national transport costs for explaining these effects. Moreover, it gives economic 
insights in the countries’ incentives to lower tariffs and to participate in free trade agreements 
with partner countries that differ in size and economic capacity. 
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Zurich. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Modern industrial production is characterized by a high degree of vertical fragmentation.
Grossman and Helpman (2002a) emphasize that an ever declining scope of activities is
undertaken within the boundaries of a single ￿rm (Coase, 1937). Accordingly, Grossman
and Helpman (2002b, p. 1) conclude that ￿We live in an age of outsourcing.￿
Of course, there is not only evidence for vertical fragmentation per se but also for
a rising scope of internationally fragmented production re￿ected in the growth of inter-
mediate goods trade (Feenstra, 1998). The international economics literature identi￿es
ak e yr o l ef o rb o t hnational (Burda and Dluhosch, 2002) and international outsourcing
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999, 2001; Hummels et al., 2001; Kohler, 2004) in the re-
cent wave of globalization. For understanding a ￿rm￿s international outsourcing decision
- i.e., the determinants of intermediate goods trade - transport costs and costs of service
links are particularly important (Jones, 2000; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Egger and
Egger, 2003).1 However, trade models typically ignore national impediments to goods
transactions (national transport costs). For Behrens et al. (2003) this as an important
handicap and one of the most distinctive features when trade theory is compared to loca-
tion theory. By referring to insights of Ohlin (1968), they emphasize that ￿changes in the
transportability of commodities (...) between and within countries aﬀect the location of
economic activities, (...) the geography of demand and, therefore, the pattern of trade￿
(ibid., p. 2).2 The importance of national transport costs is also emphasized by Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2004, p. 19) who remark that the ￿purchase of both foreign and
domestic goods need to go through the local distribution system before reaching the ￿nal
1There is broad consensus that, despite technological improvements in recent years, transport costs
are still an important characteristic of (national and international) commodity transactions. Based on
empirical results, Rietveld and Vickerman (2004, p. 229) argue that ￿although in terms of money and
time, the performance of transport has improved enormously, many economic activities have not become
footloose to the extent as expressed by the notion of ￿death of distance￿. One of the reasons discussed is
the role of transaction costs, some being clearly related with distance.￿
2However, costless intra-regional or intra-national goods trade is as well assumed in many of the recent
New Economic Geography (NEG) models. As Head and Mayer (2004, p. 10) indicate that ￿[t]he standard
practice in NEG models is to assume free trade within regions￿ and, at least in empirical applications,
regions are often associated with countries.
2user￿, so that sheer geographical distance is associated with unavoidable local transport
costs. Accordingly, a rigorous analysis of the role of national and international transport
costs in a world with technologically feasible outsourcing should be of particular relevance.
Such an analysis requires a model that accounts for the spatial dimension of countries.
Recently, a few studies have accounted for both the geographical dimension and the
population size of countries in models of trade with spatial competition ￿ la Hotelling
(Shachmurove and Spiegel, 1995; Tharakan, 2001; and Tharakan and Thisse, 2002). Such
models allow to investigate the impact of national transport costs on the pattern and
volume of trade between adjacent economies. However, the existing studies have focused
on ￿nal goods trade only.
The contribution of this paper is to introduce fragmentation and outsourcing into a
linear model ￿ la Hotelling. This allows us to identify a trade-oﬀ of being large and
to investigate its impact on the ￿nal goods trade pattern and the welfare eﬀects of trade
liberalization in a world with two asymmetrically sized economies. This trade-oﬀ is driven
by the following two eﬀects.
On the one hand, a larger population size leads to a higher degree of vertical spe-
cialization and, under autarky, to more intensive national outsourcing. This is a labor
division eﬀect, which was ￿rst mentioned in Adam Smith￿s ￿Wealth of Nations￿. It im-
plies lower variable production costs in the case of outsourcing and, thus, an advantage
of a (population-wise) large economy.3 On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that
￿on average ￿rms facing larger markets are larger￿ (Kumar et al., 1999, p. 1). Hence, if a
population-rich economy is also geographically large4, we can on average expect large geo-
graphical distances between producers and consumers of ￿nal output under autarky. This
gives rise to a transport-cost related disadvantage of a (geographically) large economy.
3A positive correlation between the size of population and the possible division of the labor force is
also mentioned in Marx￿ ￿Das Kapital￿ (German edition of 1980, vol. 1, chapter 12, p. 373): ￿Wie f￿r
die Teilung der Arbeit innerhalb der Manufaktur eine gewisse Anzahl gleichzeitig angewandter Arbeiter
die materielle Voraussetzung bildet, so f￿r die Teilung der Arbeit innerhalb der Gesellschaft die Gr￿￿e
der Bev￿lkerung und ihre Dichtigkeit, ...￿.
4 For instance, there is a strong positive correlation between geographical area and population size
among the EU15 members as well as among the OECD economies.
3To analyze this trade-oﬀ, we proceed in the following way. In a ￿rst step, we set
up a partial equilibrium model ￿ la Hotelling with one ￿nal goods producer located at
the center of a linear economy and compare the autarky equilibrium under integrated
production with the autarky equilibrium under (national) outsourcing. In a second step,
the free trade equilibrium between two diﬀerently sized countries is analyzed. This gives
insights in the importance of the aforementioned trade-oﬀ of being large for the pattern of
trade and the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. Moreover, the analysis points to the
role of outsourcing for understanding why diﬀerently sized economies can simultaneously
gain from trade liberalization. In contrast to previous models of ￿nal goods trade only,
our framework gives rise to gains from trade that render all involved economies better oﬀ.
This can be important to understand, why economies are willing to participate in free
trade agreements like the EU or NAFTA.
Regarding the impact of trade liberalization, we distinguish between short-run (for
given entry/exit and location decisions of ￿rms) and long-run eﬀects. This facilitates
the exposition and allows us to disentangle pure competition eﬀects from location and
entry/exit eﬀects. With respect to the modes of ￿nal goods production prevailing in
the free trade equilibrium, we consider a number of diﬀerent scenarios, including the
empirically relevant case of national outsourcing in large and international outsourcing in
small economies. Indeed, 1995 data of the EU15 economies lend support to the model
implications. Namely, (i) national outsourcing of these countries is positively associated
with population size with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.54; (ii) the measure of international
outsourcing is negatively correlated with population size as re￿ected by a coeﬃcient of
−0.61 (both coeﬃcients are signi￿cant at 5%).
The analysis also contributes to the discussion on market thickness eﬀects of inter-
national openness. Similar to McLaren (2000), we can show that falling trade barriers
impact on the structure of industrial production, i.e., on whether ￿rms produce integrated
or outsource manufacture of inputs. However, our results make clear that this may lead to
devastating eﬀects of trade liberalization, regarding the degree of vertical fragmentation
in the production of ￿nal output. This is a new insight which is in contrast to McLaren￿s
4"law" of increasing outsourcing and should be of particular relevance for the empirical
analysis of the eﬀects of trade liberalization.
The paper is organized in the following way. Sections 2 and 3 present the basic
framework of outsourcing in a spatial model ￿ la Hotelling and characterize the autarky
equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes trade liberalization between two asymmetrically sized
economies and investigates the price-setting behavior and the ￿nal goods trade pattern
as a function of national transport costs. The focus lies on a short-run perspective for
given entry/exit and location decisions of ￿rms. The (short-run) welfare eﬀects of trade
liberalization are addressed in Section 5. Section 6 presents two extensions, namely Nash
bargaining on input prices (in contrast to an unilateral price choice of the input producer
in Sections 3-5) and long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization. Section 7 concludes with a
summary of the most important results.
2B a s i c m o d e l s e t u p
Consider a linear model ￿ la Hotelling with one ￿nal goods producer located at the center
of a country of length l, i.e., at l/2. In the following, we use the notion ￿country l￿f o rs u c h
an economy. The location of the ￿nal goods producer is ￿xed.5 P o p u l a t i o ni nc o u n t r yl
is uniformly distributed along the line [0,l] with one consumer located at each address
b ∈ [0,l].H e n c e ,l refers to both the geographical size of the country and the mass of its
population, i.e., the number of consumers.6 Each consumer buys at most one unit of the
consumption good. ￿Disutility￿ from a larger distance of consumers to the ￿nal goods
producer is represented by quadratic transportation costs.7 The marginal willingness to
5Set-up costs of ￿nal goods producers are not explicitly considered for the purpose of notational
simplicity. Hence, pro￿ts of ￿nal goods suppliers refer to operative pro￿ts or the producer surplus.
6For the main mechanisms and results of our paper, this assumption is not criticial. The ￿ndings hold,
as long as there is a positive correlation between the geographical size and population size of economies.
See Footnote 4 for the empirical stylized facts.
7The assumption of quadratic transport costs is not important for the autarky situation. However,
this assumption will be crucial for the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in prices under free trade. See the
discussion in Footnote 18. There is an extensive literature on the existence of price equilibria in spatial
models (see among others d￿Aspremont et al., 1979; Anderson, 1987; and Osborne and Pitchik, 1986).
5pay for the consumption good depends on the location of a consumer (b)a n di sg i v e nb y
A − (b − l/2)
2,w h e r el/2 is the position of the ￿nal goods producer.
The contribution of this study is to allow for two diﬀerent production technologies in
a spatial model of trade. First, as in Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) and Tharakan and
Thisse (2002), there is an integrated production mode, where the whole production process
takes place in-house. Second, the ￿nal goods producer may fragment the production
process and engage in outsourcing by purchasing intermediate inputs from an external
supplier at arm￿s length.
We assume that integrated production (index i) exhibits constant marginal costs ci,
with A>c i > 0. In the case of outsourcing, the down-stream ￿nal goods producer (index
d) uses one unit of a component, purchased from an up-stream input supplier (index u), to
manufacture one unit of ￿nal output. The input price (net of transport costs) is given by
ρ. An input producer has to invest ￿xed costs in the amount of f to set up a production
plant. If the input producer does not stay at l/2, there are quadratic transport costs
for shipping the component to the ￿nal goods producer. Transport costs per unit of the
intermediate good are given by t(l/2 − xu)
2,w h e r exu ∈ [0,l] is the location of the input
supplier and l/2 the location of the ￿nal goods producer. Intermediate inputs and ￿nal
output are two diﬀerent types of goods so that the transportation technologies for shipping
intermediate and ￿nal output may also be diﬀerent. This is re￿ected by parameter t R 1.
In the absence of any additional production costs in the down-stream process, ρd :=
ρ+t(l/2 − xu)
2 are (transport-cost-including) variable production costs of the downstream
￿nal goods producer in the case of outsourcing. The technology of (outsourced) input
production exhibits constant marginal production costs cu.W e a s s u m ecu <c i.I fci >
cu + t(l/2 − xu)
2, there are gains from fragmenting production (outsourcing). In the
following, we use the notion ￿cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing￿t or e f e r
to these gains which are related to the division of labor.8 If there is no input producer
Hamoudi and Moral (2003) investigate the existence under concave and convex transport costs. For the
purpose of simplicity, we stick to the textbook case of quadratic transport costs.
8Grossman and Helpman (2002a, pp. 90-91) remark the following: ￿The possibility that production
may be more costly for an integrated ￿rm re￿ects the fact that its activities are not so highly specialized
6who supplies the required fragment, the ￿nal goods producer does not have access to
outsourcing and is therefore tied to the integrated production mode.
3 Autarky equilibrium
There is a sequence of ￿ve decisions that determines the autarky equilibrium: (i) Input
producers decide upon entry and location. (ii) After entry, input producers set a price ρ
vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer (a monopolist in the ￿nal goods market).9 (iii) Based
on that price, the transport costs for input transactions and marginal production costs
ci,t h e￿nal goods producer chooses between in-house supply of the input (integrated
production) and purchases from outside the ￿rm (outsourcing). (iv) The ￿nal goods
producer ￿nishes the product and sets the mill price for the ￿nal good.10 (v) Consumers
make their purchases. See Figure 1 for a summary of these decisions.
>Figure 1<
The autarky equilibrium can be derived through backward induction.
Stage (v) - Consumption: A consumer located at address b has positive demand if
A>p(b): =p +( b − l/2)
2,w h e r ep is the ￿nal good￿s mill price. Hence, aggregate ￿nal
g o o d sd e m a n di sg i v e nb y 11
D =

   









p ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
p ∈ (A − l2/4,A]
p>A
.( 1 )
and that the bureaucratic cost of managing a larger operation may be higher.￿
9In an extension, we investigate Nash bargaining as an alternative input-price-determination process.
See Subsection 6.1.
10We use the term ￿mill price￿ in the context of ￿nal goods transactions but not in the context of
component purchases since we will allow for (spatial) price discrimination of input producers under free
trade. See Tharakan (2001) for a similar use of the term.
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adjusted) Stage (iv) - Price setting of the ￿nal goods producer: The ￿nal goods producer
sets the pro￿t-maximizing mill price in view of (1). Pro￿ts under integrated production
and pro￿ts under outsourcing must be distinguished.
First, if the single ￿nal goods producer located at the center of market l produces the











pi ∈ (A − l2/4,A]
pi ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
, (2)










A<c i +3 l2/4
A ≥ ci +3 l2/4
.( 3 )














pd ∈ (A − l2/4,A]
pd ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
, (4)
where ρd = ρ + t(l/2 − xu)
2 is the transport-cost-including input price paid by the ￿nal
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A ≥ ρd +3 l2/4
.( 5 )
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A<ρ d +3 l2/4
A ≥ ρd +3 l2/4
.( 7 )
12Of course, π(pi)=0if pi >A ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) .
8Hence, if there is a specialized input producer active in country l,t h e￿nal goods producer
opts for outsourcing, if ci ≥ ρd = ρ + t(l/2 − xu)
2, and chooses integrated production, if
ci <ρ d = ρ + t(l/2 − xu)
2.
From now on, the analysis is restricted to a parameter domain that guarantees full
coverage under autarky so that all consumers buy one unit of the consumption good,
irrespective of whether outsourcing or integrated production is chosen by the ￿nal goods
producer. A suﬃcient condition for such a parameter domain is given by Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 A>c i +3 l2/4.
Consider integrated production ￿rst. A>c i +3 l2/4 implies pi = A − l2/4 (see (3)).
Second, note that outsourcing is chosen if and only if ρd ≤ ci. T h u s ,i nt h ec a s eo f
outsourcing A>c i +3l2/4 implies A>ρ d +3l2/4 and, therefore, pd = A−l2/4 (see (5)).
In sum, under Assumption 1, pi = pd = A−l2/4 and D = l, according to (1), (3) and (5).
Stage (ii) - Price setting of input producers: Let Z0
+ be the set of integers equal
to or larger than zero and let nu ∈ Z0
+ be the number of identical input producers entering
market l at stage (i). Then, according to the analysis of stage (ii) and Assumption 1,
















ρj ≤ ci − t(l/2 − xj
u)
2
ρj >c i − t(l/2 − xj
u)
2 ,( 8 )
if j has entered and located at address xj
u in stage (i). lj, j ∈ [1,n u], denotes the amount
of sales of input producer j,i fnu ≥ 1.13 Furthermore, if nu =1and there is a cost
advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing as compared to integrated production, i.e.,
if cu ≤ ci − t(l/2 − xu)
2,t h ep r o ￿t-maximizing input price is14 ρ = ci − t(l/2 − xu)
2 and








13If all input producers locate at the same address (and nu ≥ 1), lj = l/nu,s i n c ea l l￿rms are identical.
14Note that ρ = ci − t(l/2 − xu)
2 implies ρd = ci.
9In contrast, price competition at the input market leads to ρ = cu and χ∗ =0 ,i f
nu ≥ 2 and input producers decide for the same (pro￿t-maximizing) address at stage (i).
Stage (i) - Entry decision and location choice of input producers: Input
producers enter and settle down at the pro￿t-maximizing location xu = l/2,i ft h e r ei s
a prospect of positive pro￿ts, i.e., if χ∗ ≥ f. In view of (9), there is no entry of input
suppliers and integrated ￿nal goods production prevails, if l<(ci − cu)/f. In contrast, if
l ≥ (ci − cu)/f, then price competition at stage (ii) implies that only one input producer
will enter and stay in the market at location xu = l/2.I fnu ≥ 2, then input producers
will always earn negative pro￿ts χ∗ − f<0 and, therefore, prefer to exit the market,
see stage (ii). Thus, nu ≥ 2 i sn o tc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ec o n c e p to fal o n g - r u na u t a r k y
equilibrium.
The main ￿ndings of the backward induction are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 the following holds in the autarky equilibrium:
(a) If l ≥ (ci − cu)/f, a single input producer enters and settles at the center of market
l, i.e., at location xu = l/2.T h e n ,ρ = ci and pd = A − l2/4 are pro￿t-maximizing input
and ￿nal goods prices, respectively, and operative pro￿ts are given by χ∗ =( ci − cu)l and
π∗
d =( A − l2/4 − ci)l.
(b) If l<(ci − cu)/f, no input producer will enter so that integrated production prevails.
In this case, pi = A − l2/4 is the relevant ￿nal goods price and π∗
i =( A − l2/4 − ci)l is
the corresponding pro￿t.
Proof. Proposition 1 follows from the backward induction above.
If an input producer enters at stage (i), she sets an input price that renders the ￿nal
goods producer indiﬀerent between integrated production and outsourcing so that the
input producer gets the whole specialization rent. This is a direct consequence of the
price-determination process in the input market. (For the impact of bargaining on the
autarky equilibrium, see Section 6.1.)
In the following analysis, we consider two asymmetrically sized economies: a small one
of size s =1and a large one of size L>1.T h et w oe c o n o m i e sm a yd i ﬀer with respect
10to the existence of an input producer (see Proposition 1). In all other respects the two
countries are identical and Assumption 1 holds for both countries so that there is full
coverage under autarky.
>Figure 2<
Figure 2 illustrates the autarky equilibrium in the two diﬀerently sized economies.
According to Proposition 1, the ￿nal goods producer in country s sets a higher mill price
than its counterpart in country L: pa
s = A − 1/4 >p a
L = A − L2/4,w h e r ea refers to
autarky. Serving the whole market implies higher transport costs and, thus, for a given
willingness to pay A, a lower mill price in country L. This result depends on Assumption
1 but it is independent of which production techniques are used in the two economies.
Regarding the mode of ￿nal goods production in the two asymmetrically sized coun-
tries, we can distinguish three cases, according to Proposition 1: (1) one with no special-
ized input producer active in countries s and L, i.e., only the integrated production mode
is available for the two ￿nal goods producers; (2) one with a single input producer active
in the large economy, but no input producer located in country s; and (3) one with two
input producers, one located in either economy. In the next section, we analyze prices and
the trade pattern in the free trade equilibrium. Thereby, we focus on short-run eﬀects and
assume that location and entry/exit decisions of ￿nal and intermediate goods producers
are given (and are the same as under autarky). Furthermore, due to the restriction of
space and motivated by empirical stylized facts on national and international outsourcing
presented in the introductory section, we focus on case (2) and assume that there is a
single input producer active in the large economy, but no input producer active in country
s. (Formally, we consider a parameter domain s =1< (ci − cu)/f ≤ L.) A discussion
of cases (1) and (3) is relegated to Subsection 6.2, where the long-run eﬀects associated
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Figure 2. Autarky equilibrium in two asymmetrically sized economies 4 Free trade equilibrium
To analyze the impact of trade liberalization, we follow the common approach and assume
that tariﬀso n￿nal goods as well as intermediate goods trade between countries s and L
fall from in￿nity to zero. Free trade means that consumers have the choice to purchase
the ￿nal good from either seller (i.e., from the one located at the center of country s or
the one located at the center of country L), but must bear the corresponding quadratic
transport costs. This implies that under free trade some consumers may purchase the
￿nal good abroad. Hence, there is cross-country competition of ￿nal goods producers
instead of the monopoly under autarky. This may but does not necessarily result in lower
￿nal goods prices as has been shown by Tharakan and Thisse (2002). In addition, ￿nal
goods producers may purchase the component from abroad, if an input producer is active
there.
For the moment, we focus on short-run eﬀects and do not investigate location and
entry/exit decisions of ￿rms. These decisions are exogenously given. In terms of Figure
1, we analyze the stage (ii)-(v) equilibrium for given (autarky) decisions at stage (i).
Long-run eﬀects associated with a stage (i)-(v) equilibrium are addressed in Section 6.
As motivated above, we focus on a scenario with a single input producer being active in
the large economy. Again, we solve the equilibrium through backward induction.
Stage (v) - Consumption: For given ￿nal goods prices ps,p L in s and L, respectively,
the marginal consumer is located in interval [0,1+L] and its address is determined by
xm (ps,p L)=

   









pL − ps < −
(L+3)(L+1)
4























A − ps, (11)










A − pL. (12)
12Then, for given prices ps,p L,
Ds =[ m i n ( v,xm) − max(0,w)], (13)
DL =[ m i n ( L +1 ,y) − max(z,xm)] (14)
represent the demand for ￿nal output produced in country s and country L, respectively.
S t a g e( i v )-P r i c es e t t i n go ft h et w o￿nal goods producers: Let ρk, k = s,L,
be the price net of transport costs of an input sold to the ￿nal goods producer in country
k. Moreover, in the case of outsourcing let ρk,d be the transport-cost-including input price
paid by the ￿nal goods producer located at the center of country k = s,L.G i v e n t h e
autarky location of the input producer in country L, ρL,d = ρL and ρs,d = ρs+t(L +1 )
2 /4.
(L +1 )/2 is the distance between the ￿nal goods producer in s and the input supplier
in L (see Figure 2). We introduce a further variable ck ∈
'
ci,ρ k,d“
, k = s,L,t oa c c o u n t
for the two production modes. Thereby, ck = ci holds, if the ￿nal goods producer in
country k produces integratedly, whereas ck = ρk,d are marginal production costs of the
down-stream process, if the ￿nal goods producer outsources component production.
According to (13) and (14), free trade pro￿ts of the ￿nal goods producers in s and L
are given by









For the case of integrated production in both economies, Tharakan and Thisse (2002)
identify four parameter domains, which determine the set of possible price equilibria. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous analysis of all possible parameter
domains. Therefore, we introduce a further (empirically plausible) assumption, namely
that trade liberalization has a pro-competitive eﬀect and leads to full coverage under free
trade. A suﬃcient condition for such an outcome is given by Assumption 2.15
15Note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1 for both countries. Hence, there is full coverage under
autarky, if there is full coverage under free trade.
13Assumption 2 A>c i + 15L2+12L
12 .
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, for all16 ck ≤ ci, k = s,L, the following holds in a free
trade equilibrium. (1) Demand for ￿nal goods produced at the two locations is given by
Ds = xm (ps,p L) and DL = L +1− xm (ps,p L), respectively. (2) There is full coverage
in the free trade equilibrium with each consumer buying one unit of ￿nal output, i.e.,
Ds + DL = L +1 .( 3 )P r o ￿ts of the two ￿nal goods producers are given by
πs =( ps − c






(L +1− xm (ps,p L)), (18)
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To obtain a unique equilibrium in prices, we impose a restriction on the price-setting
behavior of ￿rms, namely pk ≥ ck, k = s,L.17 Then, maximizing pro￿ts (17) and (18)
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cL ≥ cs + γ2
(20)
16As shown in stage (iii), ck >c i is not consistent with an equilibrium.
17 It is shown in the proof of Appendix A that some pk <c k may be consistent with an equilibrium, if
there are zero sales of the ￿nal goods producer located in country k. Such price equilibria are ruled out
by the proposed assumption on the price-setting behavior of ￿rms. For a logically similar problem in a
diﬀerent context, see Ludema and Wooton (2000).
14where γ1 := (5L +7 )( L +1 )/4 and γ2 := (7L +5 )( L +1 )/4.18 Note that p∗
s <p a
s =
A − 1/4 and p∗
L <p a
L = A − L2/4 are a direct consequence of cs ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci and
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cL ≥ cs + γ2
. (21)
Stage (iii) - Outsourcing decision: The ￿nal goods producer in country k = s,L
chooses outsourcing, if ρk,d ≤ ci. Otherwise, production is integrated.
Stage (ii) - Price setting of the input producer: Two cases must be dis-
tinguished with respect to the size of transport costs for input transactions: (a) t>
4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2 and (b) t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2. We investigate Case (a) ￿rst.
4.1 Technical exclusion of international outsourcing: Case (a)
Let us ￿rst show that t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2 is not consistent with international out-
sourcing in the free trade equilibrium. For this, note that t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2 can
be reformulated as cu >c i − t(L +1 )
2 /4. Hence, negative pro￿ts are obtained for sales
to the ￿nal goods producer in country s,i fap r i c eρs ≤ ci − t(L +1 )
2 /4 <c u is chosen




cs. Therefore, the results of stage (iii) for the outsourcing decision of the two ￿nal goods
producers imply that international outsourcing is not consistent with a pro￿t-maximizing
price of the input producer, if t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2. The input producer chooses
18 The existence of a price equilbrium (19) and (20) critically depends on the assumption of quadratic
transport costs. d￿Aspremont et al. (1979) show that a minimum distance between the locations of the two
￿nal goods producers is essential for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices under linear transport
costs. However, as shown in Tharakan (2001) this ￿minimum distance condition￿ is not satisi￿ed by
locations 1/2 and 1+L/2 of the two ￿nal goods producers (and country sizes L>s=1 ). Therefore,
a price equilibrium under linear transport costs is not consistent with our assumptions regarding the
locations of the two ￿nal goods producers (at least if marginal production costs of the two ￿nal goods
producers are identical, i.e., if cs = cL; see our discussion below).
15ρs >c i − t(L +1 )
2 /4 and ￿nal goods production in country s remains integrated under
free trade. In this case, we speak of technical exclusion of international outsourcing (since
the transportation technology does not allow for international outsourcing).
If ρL >c i,o p e r a t i v ep r o ￿ts of the input producer are zero. If ρL ∈ (cu,c i],o p e r a t i v e




















ρL ∈ [ci − γ1,c i]
ρL <c i − γ1
, (22)
with γ1 =( 5 L +7 )( L +1 )/4. The input producer faces the following trade-oﬀ by setting
the optimal price. On the one hand, a lower price reduces revenues for a given volume
of sales. But on the other hand, a lower price increases demand for intermediate goods,
since it makes the ￿nal goods producer in country L more competitive and reduces her
transport-cost-related size disadvantage for serving consumers located near the common
border, see (21).20 In other words, the ￿nal goods producer of country L can participate
in the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing, if the input producer sets a price
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with ci := cu +( 7 L +5 )( L +1 )/4 and ci := cu +( 1 7 L + 19)(L +1 )/4.N o t e t h a t ρL∗
depends on ￿nal goods transport costs and the size of the two economies but it does not
depend on parameter t, since international outsourcing does not occur in equilibrium.
It is an immediate consequence of (23) that ρL <c i − (5L +7 )( L +1 )/4 cannot be an
optimal price choice. The reason is that at an input price ρL = ci − (5L +7 )( L +1 )/4
the marginal consumer is located at xm =0 , according to (21), and the whole integrated
market (L +1 ) is served by the ￿nal goods producer of country L, i.e., DL = L +1 .
19Substituting ci = cs and ρL (≤ ci)=cL in (21) gives DL = L +1− xm
¡
ci,ρ L¢
> 0.T h i si su s e di n
(22).
20We speak of a transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy, since country L imports
the ￿nal good, i.e., xm ∈ (1,L+1 ) ,a tcs = cL.
16Thus, a further price reduction cannot be an optimal strategy for the input producer,
since it leaves the volume of sales unaﬀected. At the other extreme, it may as well be the
case that, even for a marginal price reduction below ci, gains from a higher sales volume
cannot oﬀset losses from lower per unit revenues. Then, setting the component price at
its autarky level ρL = ci is the optimal price choice for the input producer. In all other
cases, ρL =( ci + cu)/2+( 7 L +5 )( L +1 )/8 is the pro￿t-maximizing input price.
The transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy implies that the ￿nal
goods mill price under free trade is higher in country L than in country s,i fρL∗ = ci,
according to (19) and (20). Things are diﬀerent, if trade liberalization leads to a reduction
of the input price, i.e., to ρL∗ <c i.I n t h i s c a s e ,t h e ￿nal goods producer in country L
can participate in the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing. This increases its
competitiveness and results in a lower ￿nal goods price p∗
L (see (20)). Final goods prices
are strategic complements. Accordingly, the ￿nal goods producer in the small country will
also reduce its price, if ρL ( a n d-a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 0 )-i nt u r na l s op∗
L) declines. However, it
is obvious from a comparison of (19) and (20) that the reduction of p∗
L is more pronounced
than the reduction of p∗
s. This implies that the marginal consumer shifts to the left, if ρL
declines (see (21)).
The possible impact of outsourcing on ￿nal goods prices under free trade is drawn in
Figure 3, where p1
L (b) and p1
s (b) refer to input prices ρL = ci,w h e r e a sp2
L (b) and p2
s (b)
refer to input prices ρL <c i. Noteworthy, the downward shift of the dotted price-location
schedule from p1
L(b) to p2
L (b) is more pronounced than the downward shift from p1
s (b) to
p2
s (b), if the input producer sets ρL <c i. (See the discussion above.)
>Figure 3<
Substituting ci = cs and, according to (23), ρL = cL in (21) gives the equilibrium
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Figure 3. Free final goods trade with 
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AAWhether the marginal consumer is located in the large or in the small economy depends
on the relative strength of two opposing forces (i.e., the following trade-oﬀ of being large),
namely the transport-cost-related size disadvantage and the outsourcing-related produc-
tion cost advantage of country L. The latter is induced by lower marginal production
costs cu <c i.21 The outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large country
is dominant, if ci − cu > (17L − 5)(L +1 )/4. According to (24), the marginal consumer
is located in the small economy and country L exports the consumption good. This case
is drawn in Figure 3. In contrast, the marginal consumer is located in L and the small
country exports the consumption good, if ci − cu < (17L − 5)(L +1 )/4.I n t h i s c a s e ,
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage dominates the outsourcing-related produc-
tion cost advantage of country L.I nt h eb o r d e r l i n ec a s eo fci−cu =( 1 7 L − 5)(L +1 )/4,
the marginal consumer is located at the common border and there is no trade in the free
trade equilibrium (see (24)).
4.2 International outsourcing from s to L:C a s e( b )
If transport costs for input transactions are suﬃciently low, i.e., if t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2,
and if ρs ∈
¡
cu,c i − t(L +1 )
2 /4
⁄
, the input producer earns non-negative operative prof-
its for sales to the ￿nal goods producer in country s. Moreover, note that the whole
integrated market (L +1 ) is served at input prices ρs = ρL = ci − t(L +1 )
2 /4. And,
according to (21), lower prices ρk vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer in country k imply
lower (at least not higher) intermediate goods sales to country k0 for a given ρk0,w i t h
k0 6= k.H e n c e , ρs <c i − t(L +1 )
2 /4 and/or ρL <c i − t(L +1 )
2 /4 are not consistent
with pro￿t maximization of the input producer. In view of stage (iii), this implies that
the pro￿t-maximizing input price vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer in country s is given
by ρs∗ = ci − t(L +1 )
2 /4,l e a d i n gt oρs,d = ci. This renders the ￿nal goods producer in
21 As mentioned in Section 2, the notion of ￿cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing￿ refers
to cheaper production under outsourcing than under integrated production. This is a prerequisite for the
￿outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L￿ (over country s), which arises due to the
existence of a local input producer and the related national outsourcing opportunities in country L.
18country s indiﬀerent between integrated production and international outsourcing. Pro￿ts





















ρL ∈ [ci − γ1,c i]
ρL <c i − γ1
, (25)
with γ1 =( 5 L +7 )( L +1 )/4.U s i n g ρs∗ = ci − t(L +1 )
2 /4 in the pro￿t-maximization
problem of country L￿s input producer gives the optimal price vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods
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Thus, by maximizing pro￿ts, the input producer applies price discrimination and sets
ρL∗ >ρ s∗ (as long as t>0).
While transport costs for input transactions are zero in the case of national outsourc-
ing, international outsourcing induces transport costs in the amount of t(L +1 )
2 /4 for
shipping one unit of the input from the upstream producer located at the center of country
L to the downstream producer located at the center of country s. Hence, there is again
an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L over country s.23 More-
over, the ￿nal goods producer in country s cannot participate in the cost advantage of
fragmentation and outsourcing over integrated production, given the optimal price choice
ρs∗ = ci−t(L +1 )
2 /4, which implies ρs,d = ci.24 Things are diﬀerent in the large economy,
where the ￿nal goods producer can participate in the cost advantage of fragmentation and
outsourcing, if the input producer sets ρL <c i. The optimal price choice ρL∗ itself de-
pends on transport costs for input transactions and, therefore, on parameter t.T h el o w e r
22Substituting ci = ρs,d = cs and ρL = cL ≤ ci in (21) gives Ds = xm
¡
ci,ρ L¢




> 0.T h i si su s e di n( 2 5 ) .
23Final goods production costs include all costs that are necessary to manufacture ￿nal output. Hence,
they also include transport costs for intermediate goods transactions in the case of international out-
sourcing.
24For the diﬀerence in the use of the two notions ￿outsourcing-related production cost advantage of
country L￿ and ￿cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing￿, see Footnote 21.
19parameter t, the higher is ρL∗,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 6 ) . I ft is high enough, there are pro￿ts
to gain from setting ρL <c i. However, if t is low, setting ρL <c i reduces pro￿ts. The
reason is that losses for given sales dominate gains arising from higher sales to the local
￿nal goods supplier. These additional sales come at the costs of lower exports to country
s (which are associated with positive operative pro￿ts, if t<4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2).25
Substituting ci = ρs,d = cs and, according to (26), ρL∗ = cL in (21) gives the equilib-
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The location of the marginal consumer again depends on two opposing eﬀects, namely
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage and the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage of country L.T a k i n g t h i s t r a d e - o ﬀ of being large into account gives the fol-
lowing result. If transport costs are suﬃciently high, i.e., if t>(17L − 5)/(L +1 )and
t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2, the input producer sets price ρL low enough, such that the
marginal consumer is located in country s and country L exports the consumption good.
In this case, the outsourcing-related production cost advantage (in the form of access
to intermediate goods without transport costs) dominates the transport-cost-related size
disadvantage of the large economy. The opposite holds true, if t<(17L − 5)/(L +1 ) .I n
this case, the marginal consumer is located in country L and country s exports the con-
sumption good. In the borderline case of t =( 1 7 L − 5)/(L +1 ) , the marginal consumer
is located at the common border and trade of ￿nal goods does not occur. However, there
are intermediate goods exports of the large economy, i.e., international outsourcing of the
￿nal goods producer in country s.
The main ￿ndings for the two diﬀerent scenarios analyzed in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2
are summarized in Proposition 2.
25Due to (7L +5 )/(L +1 )> 1, it follows from (26) that ρL∗ = ci for all t ≤ 1. Hence, ρL∗ <c i requires
that transportation of intermediate goods induces higher costs than transportation of ￿nal output.
20Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, if there is a single input producer located in country
L, the following holds. In the free trade equilibrium there is international outsourcing of
the ￿nal goods producer in country s, if transport costs for input transactions are not
too high, i.e., if t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2. In contrast, t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2 implies
technical exclusion of international outsourcing and integrated production in country s.I n
both cases, country L exports the consumption good, if the outsourcing-related production
cost advantage dominates the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy.
Otherwise, country s exports the consumption good.
Proof. Proposition 2 follows from the analysis above.
5W e l f a r e e ﬀects of trade liberalization
In Section 4 we have investigated how trade liberalization aﬀects the price-setting behavior
of input and ￿nal goods producers. This has shed some light on the trade pattern between
two asymmetrically sized economies. The results of the above analysis are now used to
determine the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. In particular, we investigate in which
way trade patterns and outsourcing opportunities are related to the welfare eﬀects of trade
liberalization. The sum of consumer surplus and pro￿ts serves as our welfare measure.
Again, we focus on short-run eﬀects and relegate the discussion of entry/exit and optimal
location decisions to Subsection 6.2.
It is an immediate consequence of Assumption 2 and the induced pro-competitive eﬀect
of trade liberalization on ￿nal goods prices that consumers in both economies bene￿tf r o m
at a r i ﬀ reduction.26 Moreover, it can be shown that welfare in the ￿nal goods exporting
country always increases. The pro-competitive eﬀect of falling tariﬀs leads to a price
r e d u c t i o ni nb o t he c o n o m i e sa n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,t ol o w e rp r o ￿ts from local sales. However, in
the ￿nal goods exporting country these pro￿t losses are fully compensated by consumer
surplus gains. In addition to this welfare-neutral redistribution eﬀect, there are pro￿t
26This is a mere price eﬀect, since Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee full coverage under autarky and free
trade.
21gains from ￿nal goods exports, leading to a positive welfare eﬀect in the ￿nal goods
exporting country. This outcome is independent of the production techniques used in the
two economies.
Which one of the two economies exports the ￿nal good depends on the respective para-
meter values. In Section 4, it has been shown that the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage of a large, population-rich economy may outweigh its transport-cost-related
size disadvantage so that it becomes the ￿nal goods exporter and, therefore, bene￿ts from
trade liberalization. However, it is not only relevant which one of the two economies
exports/imports the ￿nal good to determine winners and losers of trade liberalization. If
there is an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large economy, then both
countries may gain from tariﬀ reductions. On the one hand, if ρL is chosen low enough and
country L exports the ￿nal output, consumer surplus gains may dominate pro￿tl o s s e s
in the small economy. Hence, welfare in country s may increase, even if it imports the
consumption good. On the other hand, in the case of international outsourcing the large
economy bene￿ts from intermediate goods exports so that welfare in the large country
may increase, even if it imports the consumption good.
Table 1 summarizes the (short-run) welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. The exis-
tence of international outsourcing depends on three factors: (a) the cost advantage of
fragmentation and outsourcing ci − cu, (b) the transport cost parameter t, and (c) the
distance between the location of the ￿nal goods producer in country s and the location
of the input producer in country L,i . e . ,(L +1 )/2. The higher the cost advantage ci−cu
and the lower the parameter t and the distance (L +1 )/2 (i.e., the lower L), the more
likely is international outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium. For the pattern of ￿nal
goods trade, also relative country size L−1 (or, more precisely, 17L−5) turns out to be
important (see Table 1). According to the considerations above, international outsourc-
ing prevails in equilibrium and country L exports ￿nal output, if the cost advantage of
fragmentation and outsourcing (ci−cu)i sh i g ha n dt h ed i ﬀerence in country sizes (L−1)
is not too large. A higher degree of market integration at the intermediate goods level,
i.e., a lower t,m a k e s￿nal goods exports of country L less likely. Things are diﬀerent if the
22cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing (ci−cu) is moderate and transport costs
for input transactions (depending on the parameter t and the distance (L +1 )/2)a r e
high. In this case, international outsourcing is technologically excluded. Again, country
L exports ￿nal output, if it is not too large and, therefore, its transport-cost-related size
disadvantage is not too high. The larger country L relative to country s (in geographical
terms), the more likely it is that country s exports the ￿nal good.27
TABLE 1. Welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization if only in country L there is interme-
diate input production
Final goods ex- Welfare eﬀects Welfare eﬀects World welfare
porting country in country s in country L eﬀects
Technical exclusion of international outsourcing, i.e., t>4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(i) ci − cu <
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 country s + − amb.
(ii) ci − cu =
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 no ￿nal goods trade 0 0 0
(iii) ci − cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 country L amb. + +
International outsourcing from s to L, i.e., t ≤ 4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(iv) t<17L−5
L+1 country s + amb. amb.
(v) t = 17L−5
L+1 no ￿nal goods trade 0 +/0 +/0
(vi) t>17L−5
L+1 country L amb. + +
Notes:I nt h i sm a t r i x ,￿ +￿, ￿−￿, and ￿0￿ mean that trade liberalization has a positive, negative or no
eﬀect on the respective welfare levels. ￿amb.￿ indicates that the impact is ambiguous.
Table 1 shows that the small and the large country can simultaneously bene￿tf r o m
declining trade barriers (scenarios (iii), (iv) and (vi)). This is an important result, since
it makes trade liberalization an attractive policy in both countries without requiring
cross-country redistribution measures. The existence of gains from trade in all (involved)
27A formal proof of the results in Table 1 is relegated to Appendix B.
23economies is a result that is well-known from the traditional trade literature. However,
the positive eﬀects of free trade are less clear in new trade theory models with imperfect
competition in goods markets. Wong (1995) gives an excellent overview on the gains
from trade for economies under imperfections. As far as spatial models are concerned,
Tharakan and Thisse (2002) investigate the impact of the geographical size of countries
on the distribution of welfare gains. In their model of ￿nal goods trade only, they come up
w i t ht h er e s u l tt h a t￿ large countries, unlike small ones, should be less inclined towards free
trade￿ (p. 399), since their welfare decreases in response to trade liberalization. In this
case, the welfare eﬀects are determined by the transport-cost-related size disadvantage
of the large economy. (Compare the welfare eﬀects under integrated production in both
economies derived in Subsection 6.2.)28
Our analysis also points to the possibility that trade liberalization leads to a decline
in overall world welfare, if exports of the small economy (partially) substitute local sales
in the large country, which are manufactured under a superior production mode and/or
without any transport costs for intermediate goods transactions (scenarios (i) and (iv) in
Table 1). Thus, trade liberalization is not always bene￿cial but may exert immiserizing
world welfare eﬀects. To put it diﬀerently, overall producer surplus losses may dominate
overall consumer surplus gains.
6 Extensions and further discussion
The analysis in Sections 4 and 5 gave insights into the role of country size for the trade
pattern and the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. Moreover, it was shown how the
geographical size and the population size interact in determining the pattern of ￿nal goods
trade. In particular, the existence of a trade-oﬀ of being large in terms of a transport-
cost-related size disadvantage and an outsourcing-related production cost advantage was
28Tharakan (2001) shows in a Hotelling model that both the geographical sizes and the population
densities of countries are important determinants of the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. Behrens et
al. (2003) discuss the welfare eﬀects of reductions in international trade barriers and national/regional
transport costs.
24pointed out. However, the results were derived under two restictive assumptions. On
the one hand, we assumed that input prices were unilaterally set by the input producer.
Given the existing literature on outsourcing in macroeconomic settings, one may be in-
terested in the robustness of our results with respect to this assumption. Therefore, we
investigate bargaining on input prices between the intermediate and ￿nal goods produc-
ers in Subsection 6.1. On the other hand, in Sections 4 and 5 we focused on short-run
eﬀects, neglecting any adjustments in the entry/exit or location decisions of ￿rms. This
assumption is relaxed in Subsection 6.2, where the long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization
are at the agenda. The limitation of space does not allow for a rigorous formal discussion
of these issues, so that Subsections 6.1 and 6.2 present the main insights in an intuitive
way.29 Finally, Subsection 6.3 relates the main insights of our long-run considerations
to the discussion on international openness and the industrial structure. Moreover, the
respective welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are summarized and considered from a
policy perspective.
6.1 Bargaining on input prices
The results in Sections 3-5 are derived under the assumption that the input producer
can unilaterally set a price vis-￿-vis ￿nal goods suppliers. This assumption diﬀers from
the price determination process usually considered in the outsourcing literature.30 The
purpose of this subsection is to discuss the robustness of our results by allowing for
Nash bargaining on input prices between upstream (input) and downstream (￿nal goods)
producers. In all other respects, the analysis in Subsection 6.1 corresponds to the analysis
in Sections 3-5. Again, we start with a discussion of the autarky equilibrium.
29A detailed formal analysis is relegated to a supplement, which is available from the authors upon
request.
30Grossman and Helpman (2002a, 2002b), for example, allow for bargaining between ￿nal goods and
input producers. In contrast, Helsely and Strange (2004) investigate take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by ￿nal
goods suppliers, while McLaren (2000) assumes an auction mechanism.
25Autarky equilibrium
Note ￿rst that the analysis in stages (iii)-(v) of the stage (i)-(v) autarky equilibrium is
not aﬀected by the aforementioned modi￿cation. Therefore, we focus on stages (i) and
(ii), when analyzing the impact of Nash bargaining between the input and ￿nal goods
producer. For simplicity ant to make the following results directly comparable with the
ones derived in Section 3-5, we assume that not more than one input producer can enter
the market at stage (i). If an input producer has entered market l and located at address
xa










where ξ ∈ (0,1) indicates the bargaining power of ￿nal goods producers and index a refers
to autarky. According to our analysis in Section 3, we can substitute πa
d, πa











Maximizing (29) with respect to ρ, then gives the following equilibrium input price (and,
thus, the solution to stage (ii)), if a single producer enters at stage (i)
ρ
a = ξcu +( 1− ξ)
£





Using (30) in stage (i), we can show that xa
u = l/2 is the optimal location of input
production under autarky. Moreover,
l ≥
f
(1 − ξ)(ci − cu)
≡ e f (31)
gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for entry of a single input producer. In sum,
Nash bargaining leads to a lower input price ρa = ξcu +( 1− ξ)ci under autarky and
makes entry of an input producer less likely. Final goods prices are not aﬀected.
31At stage (ii), the outside option of the input producer is −f and her contribution to the Nash product
equals χa.
26Free trade equilibrium with t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2
Let us focus on a short-run free trade equilibrium with given entry/exit and location
decisions of ￿rms and a single input producer active in country L. T h i si sc o n s i s t e n t
with optimal decisions under autarky, if paramter domain L ≥ e f>s=1prevails. The
solutions to stages (iii)-(v) are identical to those derived in Section 4. The only diﬀerence
arises with respect to the price determination process in stage (ii). When focussing on
parameter domain t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2, it is obvious that there is technical exclusion
of international outsourcing as shown in Subsection 4.1. Moreover, it is intuitively clear
and can formally be shown that the input price vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer in
the large economy is lower (at least not higher) under Nash bargaining than under a
unilateral price choice of the input producer as considered in Section 4. Hence, under
Nash bargaining on input prices it is more likely that the marginal consumer is resident
of the small economy and that country L exports ￿nal output in a free trade equilibrium
with technical exclusion of international outsourcing. Moreover, welfare eﬀects in the
large economy are more likely to be positive, while the impact on welfare eﬀects in the
small economy is less clear-cut.
Free trade equilibrium with t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2
From Subsection 4.2, we know that the input producer may have an incentive to bargain
with both ￿nal goods suppliers, if t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2. We think of bargaining as a
t w os t e pp r o c e s s .I ns t e po n e ,￿rms decide on whether to participate in a Nash bargain
or not. Based on these decisions, there is Nash bargaining on input prices in step two.
At this stage, it is common knowledge, which ￿rms participate in a Nash bargaining unit.
In line with the literature on trade union theory (see, e.g., Layard and Nickell, 1990;
Beissinger and Egger, 2004), ￿rms have perfect foresight and, therefore, anticipate the
outcome of the other bargaining unit (if one exists). There is no possibility to renegotiate
the bargaining outcome. Hence, if bargaining fails, the outside options are realized.
Unfortunately, the complexity of this problem does not allow us to use analytical tools.
27Rather, we must stick to simulation techniques and have to solve numerical examples.
Thereby, we use the following parameter values ξ =0 .45, cu =1 , ci =3 5 , A = 100,
L ∈ [2,4.75] and t ∈ [1,5.75] to obtain a contour plot for the possible patterns of ￿nal
goods trade.
>Figure 4<
From Figure 4 it is obvious that both regime xm ∈ [0,1),w i t hc o u n t r yL exporting
the ￿nal good, and regime xm ∈ (1,L+1 ) ,w i t hc o u n t r yL importing the ￿nal good, are
consistent with Nash bargaining on input prices. A higher transport cost parameter t
(for a given country size L) raises the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of
the large economy and, therefore, makes ￿nal goods exports of country L more likely.
This coincides with our ￿ndings in Subsection 4.2. To the contrary, a larger country
size in geographical terms ampli￿es the transport-cost-related size disadvantage. As a
consequence, a higher L makes ￿nal goods exports of country s more likely. However,
there is a further eﬀect of country size L and transport cost parameter t.F o rs u ﬃciently
high levels of t and L, we end up with a parameter domain t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2,
implying technical exclusion of international outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium.
T h i si s ,w h a th a p p e n sa b o v ea n dt ot h er i g h to ft h eb o l dl i n ei n( t h et o pr i g h tc o r n e r
of) Figure 4, where the ￿nal goods producer in country L has exclusive access to the
intermediate goods manufactured by the specialized input producer.
We are not only interested in the pattern of ￿nal goods trade but also in the welfare
eﬀects of trade liberalization. These eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 5. As long as country
size diﬀerences and transport costs for input transactions are not too large, trade liberal-
ization should increase welfare in both economies. However, welfare gains are less likely
for the large economy if L is high. Welfare gains in the small country are less likely for
high levels of transport costs and suﬃciently large L. Under such a parameter domain,
there is not much scope for bargaining on input prices and the consumers in s cannot
suﬃciently participate in the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L.
Such an outcome is in accordance with the welfare eﬀects presented in Section 5.
28 
 
Figure 4. Different bargaining outcomes (Contour plot) 
Region 1:  () 0,1 m x ∈ and bargaining with both 
final goods suppliers; 
Region 2:  () 0,1 m x ∈ and exclusive bargaining with 
the final goods supplier in L; 
Region 3:  () 1, 1 m xL ∈+  and bargaining with both 
final goods suppliers; 
Region 4:  () 1, 1 m xL ∈+  and exclusive bargaining 
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Summing up, we can conclude that the main results of Sections 4 and 5 survive, if we
allow for bargaining on input prices. In this sense, our focus on input-price-setting by the
input producer can be interpreted as a simplifying rather than restrictive assumption.
6.2 Long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization
To investigate the long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization, we consider the basic model
assumptions and, in particular, assume that the input producer unilaterally sets a price
vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods suppliers. Due to price competition at the input market, it is
intuitive that not more than two input producers can survive in the long-run free trade
equilibrium. Hence, we have to account for three regimes with regard to the number
of active input producers: (a) no input producer is active; (b) two input producers are
active; (c) one input producer remains active.
Scenario (a): A long-run equilibrium with integrated production in both
economies
Using cs = ci and cL = ci in (19), (20) and (21), we ￿nd that ￿nal goods prices in the long-






12 , if production
is integrated in both economies. The marginal consumer is located at x∗
m = 5L+7
12 ,i m p l y i n g
￿nal goods exports of country s.
At identical mill prices, the ￿nal goods producer in country L faces a transport-cost-
related disadvantage vis-￿-vis its competitor in s for serving consumers located near the
common border. In addition, ￿nal goods producers take into account the following two
eﬀects of a price reduction. On the one hand, for a given price of the competitor a lower
￿nal goods price implies higher ￿nal goods sales as the marginal consumer moves away
(see (10)). But on the other hand, it results in lower revenues for given output. This
negative pro￿te ﬀect is higher for the ￿nal goods supplier in country L, due to its larger







Figure 5. Welfare effects of trade liberalization (Contour plot) 
Region 1:  0 L W ∆>  and  0 s W ∆> ;
Region 2:  0 L W ∆>  and  0 s W ∆< ;










0.75  5.75 2  3.25  4.5large country optimally chooses a higher price than its competitor in the small economy.
Together with the transport-cost-related disadvantage of country L for serving consumers
located close to the common border, this implies that the marginal consumer is resident
of the large country (located at address xm = 5L+7
12 < 1+L/2) and the small country
exports the ￿nal good.
Compared with welfare under autarky, the export-related pro￿t gains lead to a wel-









db > 0 in the small economy. (Superscript LR
always refers to the long-run.) This corresponds to the general observation that trade lib-
eralization is always bene￿cial for the ￿nal goods exporting country. Things are diﬀerent








[b − (1 + L/2)]








(ci − cu)db+f −∆W
LR
s , (32)
with ∆T = 5
288 (L +1 )( L − 1)
2 representing the transport cost disadvantage of country L
for serving consumers located close to the common border. It can be shown that consumer
surplus gains are dominated by pro￿t losses so that trade liberalization induces a welfare
decline in country L,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y∆WL = − 5
96 (3L3 +5 L2 − 3L − 5)−(ci − cu)L+
f<0. Finally, overall world welfare changes are ambiguous. On the one hand, there





, i.e., ∆T>0. On the other hand, there are negative welfare eﬀects, since the
superior outsourcing technology in country L is replaced by the integrated production
mode. In sum, we ￿nd ∆W LR = ∆W LR
s +∆W LR
L = ∆T −(ci − cu)L+f R 0 The sign of
∆W LR depends on the particular parameter constellation and is in general ambiguous.
Scenario (b): A long-run equilibrium with two input producers
Note ￿rst that for any location of input producer 1, x1
u, there are only two candidates
for an optimal location choice of input producer 2,n a m e l yx2
u =1 /2 and x2
u =1+L/2.
32R L+1
1 (ci − cu)db − f>0 are pro￿ts of the input producer under autarky, which do not have an
analogon in the long-run free trade equilibrium if production in both economies is integrated.
30This is an immediate consequence of positive transport costs for input transactions (see
our discussion in Section 3). Moreover, if x1
u =1 /2,t h e nx2
u =1+L/2 is the best choice,
while x2
u =1 /2 is the best response to x1
u =1+L/2. As a consequence, the two input
producers are separated to locations xs
u =1 /2 and xL
u =1+L/2 (the best reply location
choices).
Given locations xs
u =1 /2 and xL
u =1+L/2, we can show that there is competitive
exclusion of international outsourcing and both ￿nal goods producers make use of na-
tional outsourcing opportunities in the long-run free trade equilibrium. Due to a larger
hinterland, the input producer in the large country has an incentive to set a higher (at
least not a lower) price than the input producer in the small economy. This implies that
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy is (potentially) rein-
forced and that the small country exports the consumption good. An outsourcing-related
production cost advantage of the large country does not arise.
Welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are qualitatively equivalent to those identi￿ed for
the case of integrated production in both economies. Welfare in the small country rises
and welfare in the large country declines. Overall world welfare is ambiguously aﬀected
by trade liberalization. On the one hand, there is a decline in overall transport cost
expenditures, which tends to increase world welfare. On the other hand, there is entrance
of a second input producer, which can only survive due to ￿nal goods exports of country
s to country L. This tends to reduce world welfare.
Scenario (c): A long-run equilibrium with one input producer
If only one input producer is active in the long-run free trade equilibrium (and loca-
tion decisions are not made strategically to deter competitors from entry), there are two
candidates for an optimal location choice. If transport costs for input transactions are
high, i.e., if t is large, the pro￿t-maximizing address for input production is given by
x∗
u =1+L/2. As a consequence, input prices and welfare eﬀects coincide with those
determined in Sections 4 and 5 for the short-run equilibrium (with given location and
entry/exit decisions of input suppliers). In contrast, if parameter t is suﬃciently low,
31the optimal location is given by x∗
u =( 7 L + 17)/24,w i t hp r o ￿t-maximizing input prices
ρL = ci − t(5L +7 )
2 /576 and ρs = ci − t(7L +5 )
2 /576 vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods produc-
ers in countries L and s, respectively. In this case, cs = cL = ci and xm =( 5 L +7 )/12,
according to (21), so that the marginal consumer is resident of the large economy.
With regard to the long-run welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization, we focus on pa-
rameter domains that make xu =( 7 L + 17)/24 the pro￿t-maximizing location of input
production, if only one input producer is active. Welfare eﬀects for xu =1+L/2 coincide
with the respective welfare eﬀects in the short-run, discussed in Section 5. Since country s
exports ￿nal output (i.e., since xm =( 5 L +7 )/12), welfare changes in the small economy









db > 0. Moreover, welfare






























It is worth noting that ∆WLR
L may be positive or negative, depending on the respective





























which may also be positive or negative.
6.3 Further discussion
In this subsection, we compare our results to insights from the literature dealing with the
relationship between international openness and the structure of industrial production.
A further purpose is to summarize the long-run welfare eﬀects and to discuss them from
a policy perspective.
32Trade liberalization and the structure of industrial production
As rigorously analyzed in Subsection 4.2, trade liberalization may lead to international
outsourcing and, thus, to a change in the small economy￿s mode of ￿nal goods production.
In the long-run, when entry/exit and location decisions of input producers are endoge-
nous, there may be entry of a further input producer and national outsourcing in both
economies. This result coincides with ￿ndings by McLaren (2000) who emphasizes that
market thickness eﬀects lead to leaner and less integrated ￿rms, when countries lower
their trade barriers. However, as made clear by scenario (a) in Subsection 6.1, competi-
tion eﬀects may also make exit of the single input producer attractive, so that integrated
production in both economies is the outcome under free trade. This is associated with
an e g a t i v ee ﬃciency eﬀect, because the superior outsourcing technology is replaced. The
possibility of such a devastating outcome is a new insight and of particular relevance,
when measuring the gains of trade empirically.
Long-run welfare eﬀects: A policy perspective
In view of the analysis above, there is no clear-cut prediction regarding the long-run
welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. If competition leads to an exit of the single input
producer and, therefore, implies integrated production in both economies or if a second
input producer enters the integrated market in the long-run, the outsourcing-related pro-
duction cost advantage of the large economy vanishes. Then, country s exports ￿nal
output. As a consequence, there are welfare gains in the small and welfare losses in the
large economy. Overall world welfare is ambiguously aﬀected. However, if a single input
producer remains active in the long-run, its autarky location at xu =1+L/2 may remain
optimal so that trade pattern and welfare eﬀects coincide with those determined in Sec-
tions 4 and 5 for the short-run equilibrium. In contrast, if the transport cost parameter
t is low, it is optimal for a single input producer to move closer to the common border
and to locate at address xu =( 7 L +5 )/24. In this case, the degree of international out-
sourcing and the magnitude of intermediate goods exports to the small economy increase,
33raising pro￿ts of country L￿s input producer. This may give rise to welfare gains of the
large economy, even though the small country exports ￿nal output (and, thus, faces a
welfare improvement).
The long-run eﬀects of trade liberalization point to the relevance of outsourcing op-
portunities for welfare gains. Only if there is an outsourcing-related production cost
advantage in the large economy, both small and large countries can simultaneously gain
from trade liberalization without measures of cross-country redistribution. (Compare the
welfare eﬀects under scenarios (a) and (b) with those under scenario (c).) As a con-
sequence, one may hypothesize that improved outsourcing opportunities from the 70s
onwards play a key role in explaining the wave of trade liberalization observed in that
period. And with regard to the economic success of the EU, the theoretical insights in this
subsection suggest that better outsourcing opportunities for European ￿rms can explain
t h ep a c eo ft h eE u r o p e a ni n t e g r a t i o np r o c e s s .
7 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the discussion of international trade in a spatial set-up, where
countries are areas rather than points. By emphasizing the role of outsourcing opportuni-
ties, our analysis is capable to identify a trade-oﬀ of being large. On the one hand, ￿rms in
geographically large economies face a transport-cost-related disadvantage with respect to
serving consumers close to borders. On the other hand, if geographically large economies
are population-rich, they face an outsourcing-related production cost advantage due to a
higher degree of vertical specialization and the dividion of labor.
With regard to the trade pattern between two asymmetrically sized economies, our
analysis reveals the main fundamentals, determining which country exports and which
country imports ￿nal output. Based on these insights, the presented model allows us to
discuss the role of national transport costs for the (short-run and long-run) welfare eﬀects
of trade liberalization. In particular, the results point to the relevance of outsourcing
opportunities and provide an economic reasoning for the willingness of countries to lower
34their tariﬀs and to enter a free trade agreement with partner countries that diﬀer in
size and economic capacity. Moreover, our framework provides novel insights into the
impact of trade liberalization on the structure of industrial production. In this respect,
the potential negative eﬀects of trade liberalization on the intensity of fragmentation and
outsourcing are of particular relevance and should be investigated in future research.
8 Appendix
A p p e n d i xA :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Consider A>c i+(15L2 +1 2 L)/12, according to Assumption 2, and use cs ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci.
The proof is organized in two steps:
Step (i): Price-setting and interior solutions





(ps − cs)xm (ps,p L)








according to (10), (11), (13) and (15). Moreover, de￿ne D1
s := (pL − ps)/(L +1 )+
(L +3 )/4( =xm), D2
s := (pL − ps)/(L +1 )+( L +1 )/4+
√
A − ps (= xm − w) and
D3
s := v − w =2
√




Ds in (15) gives
φ
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s := ( ps − c
s)2
p
A − ps, (38)







s, according to (35)-(38). (Hence, the properties of φ
j
s translate into the properties


















































Evaluating (39)-(41) at autarky prices pa
s = A − 1/4, pa









































s +3 /2 − 2A. (44)












2 < 0, ∂2φ
j
s/∂ps∂pL ≥ 0 and the
fact that πs is a continuous function in ps (see (35)), it follows that pL ≤ pa
L and Ds > 0
are only consistent with a free trade equilibrium, if ps <p a
s. (Existence of such an equi-
librium will be discussed below.)


















according to (10), (12), (14) and (16). Moreover, de￿ne D1
L := (3L +1 )/4−(pL − ps)/(L +1 )
(= L +1− xm), D2
L := (L +1 )/4 − (pL − ps)/(L +1 )+
√
A − pL (= y − xm) and
D3
L := y − z =2
√
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L, according to (45)-(48). (Hence, he properties of φ
j
L translate into the properties


















































Evaluating (39)-(41) at autarky prices pa
s = A − 1/4, pa
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L/∂pL∂ps ≥ 0 and the
fact that πL is a continuous function in pL (see (45)), it follows that ps ≤ pa
s and DL > 0
are only consistent with a free trade equilibrium if pL <p a
L.
Finally, note that ps >p a
s and pL >p a
L cannot simultaneously hold in the free trade
equilibrium, if pa
s and pa
L are pro￿t-maximizing prices under autarky. Then, an interior
solution with Ds > 0 and DL > 0 is only consistent with pro￿t maximization of the two
￿nal goods producers, if pL <p a
L and ps <p a
s simultaneously hold in equilibrium. This
















s = A − 1/4 and pL <p a
L = A − L2/4 can be shown by using cs ≤ ci and cL ≤ ci together
with A>c i +
¡
15L2 +1 2 L
¢
/12.
37(These prices are obtained by setting (39) and (49) equal to zero. Second-order conditions
for pro￿tm a x i m aa r ef u l ￿lled, due to ∂2φ
1
s/∂p2
s < 0 and ∂2φ
1
L/∂p2
L < 0.) Using (55) and
(56) in (10)-(14) gives
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Step (ii): Price setting and corner solutions:
There are two candidates for corner solutions, namely Ds =0and DL =0 .A ni n t e r i o r
solution with Ds > 0 is not compatible with pro￿t maximization of the two ￿nal goods
producers, according to (57), if cL ≤ cs − (5L +7 )( L +1 )/4. In this case, equilibrium
prices ful￿ll34 pL = ps − (L +3 )( L +1 )/4 and ps ≤ cs so that xm =0 , according to
(10), and, therefore, DL = L +1 , Ds =0 . In contrast, if cL ≥ cs +( 7 L +5 )( L +1 )/4,
an interior solution with DL > 0 is not compatible with pro￿t maximization of the
two ￿nal goods producers, according to (58). In this case, equilibrium prices ful￿ll ps =
pL−(3L +1 )( L +1 )/4 and pL ≤ cL so that xm = L+1, according to (10), and, therefore,
Ds = xm = L +1 , DL =0 .
According to steps (i) and (ii) the following holds in the free trade equilibrium. De-
mand for ￿nal output produced in the two countries is given by Ds = xm and DL =
L +1− xm, respectively, so that Ds + DL = L +1 . Together with (15) and (16) this
implies πs =( ps − cs)xm (ps,p L) and πL =
¡
pL − cL¢
(L +1− xm (ps,p L)) and, therefore,
establishes Lemma 1. ¥
34Although the ￿nal goods producer in country s is indiﬀerent between all ps ≥ cs if Ds =0 , prices
ps >c s are not consistent with an equilibrium. Moreover, the price equilibrium is not unique if cL <
cs − (5L +7 )( L +1 )/4. In this case, not only ps = cs but also some ps <c s are consistent with an
equilibrium.
38Appendix B: Formal derivation of the welfare eﬀects of trade
liberalization
Assumption 2 is considered throughout Appendix B.
The case of technical exclusion of international outsourcing: t>4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider ci − cu < (17L − 5)(L +1 )/4.T h e n , x∗
m > 1 follows, according to
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L − cu]db, (60)
where pa
L (b)=pa
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where ci = cu+(7L +5 )( L +1 )/4, according to (23), and e ci := cu+(17L − 5)(L +1 )/4
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Since ci − cu < (L − 1)(L +1 )/24 implies ci <c i, it is straightforward to show that
∆W R 0 if ci − cu Q (L − 1)(L +1 )/24.
Part (ii): If ci − cu =( 1 7 L − 5)(L +1 )/4, then the marginal consumer is located at
x∗
m =1 , according to (24), so that welfare in both economies and, therefore, also overall
world welfare are unaﬀected by free trade, i.e., ∆W = ∆Wk =0 , k = s,L.
Part (iii): Consider ci − cu > (17L − 5)(L +1 )/4.T h e n ,x∗
m < 1 holds, according to
(24), so that trade liberalization leads to a welfare gain in the large economy, which is




















s − ci]db, (66)
where pa
s (b)=pa
s +[b − 1/2]
2 and p∗
L (b)=p∗
L+[b − (1 + L/2)]
2. pa
s = A−1/4, according


















ci ∈ (e ci,ci]
, (67)
where ci = cu+(17L + 19)(L +1 )/4,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 3 ) ,a n de ci = cu+(17L − 5)(L +1 )/4
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. (69)
40Using x∗


















ci ∈ (e ci,ci]
. (70)
From (70) it is obvious that ∆Ws R 0 if ci−cu R (17L + 11)(L +1 )/4.( R e m e m b e rt h a t
































ci ∈ (e ci,ci]
, (71)
with ∆W>0. This completes the proof. ¥
The case of international outsourcing: t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider t<17L−5
L+1 . Then, x∗
m > 1 h o l d s ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 7 ) ,s ot h a tt r a d e





s − ci]db > 0.T h e r e b y , ρs,d = ci has been used.




















s∗ − cu]db, (72)
where pa
L(b)=pa
L +[ b − (1 + L/2)]
2, p∗
s (b)=p∗
s +[ b − 1/2]






































. Note that (72) accounts for the fact that




[ρs∗ − cu]db from intermediate
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db − ∆Ψ4, (74)




































has been used. Using x∗






































Since t ≤ 4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2, it is straightforward to show that the sign of ∆WL is
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From (77) it is obvious that the sign of ∆W is ambiguous. However, t<(L − 1)/[6(L +1 ) ]
is suﬃcient for ∆W>0.35 Thereby, (L − 1)/[6(L +1 ) ]< (7L +5 )/(L +1 )has been
considered.
Part (ii): Note that there is no trade of the consumption good, if t =( 1 7 L − 5)/(L +1 ) ,
according to (27). Thus, ρs,d = ρs∗ + t(L +1 )
2 /4=ci implies that welfare in country
s is not aﬀected by trade liberalization. Due to exports of the intermediate good, wel-
fare changes in L are given by ∆WL =
Z 1
0
[ρs∗ − cu]db, which are strictly positive if t<
4(ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2. In contrast, welfare in L is unchanged, if t =4( ci − cu)/(L +1 )
2.
Overall world welfare changes are determined by welfare changes in L, i.e., ∆W = ∆WL,
since ∆Ws =0 .
Part (iii): Consider t>(17L − 5)/(L +1 ) . Then, x∗
m < 1 holds, according to (27),












[ρs∗ − cu]db are pro￿ts obtained
35Moreover, t> L−1
6(L+1) and t =4ci−cu
(L+1)2 are suﬃcient for ∆W<0.
42from intermediate goods exports to country s.U s eρs,d = ci . Then, welfare changes in















s − ci]db, (78)
where pa
s (b)=pa
s +[b − 1/2]
2 and p∗
L (b)=p∗
L+[b − (1 + L/2)]
2. pa
s = A−1/4, according
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Thus, ∆Ws R 0 if t R (17L +1 1 )/(L +1 ) .( R e m e m b e r t h a t t>(17L − 5)/(L +1 )
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Thereby, ∆W>0 holds since ci − cu ≥ t(L +1 )
2 /4 and t(> (17L − 5)/(L +1 ) )> 1.
This completes the proof. ¥
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